How Iraq’s Federal Court Abandoned the Constitution

Since its founding in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s fall, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court was envisioned as a bulwark of the country’s nascent democracy. It was entrusted with upholding the Constitution, mediating conflicts among branches of government, and safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Iraq’s diverse citizenry.

But over the past decade—and with disturbing acceleration since the October 2019 protests—the Court has abandoned its constitutional role. It has become something else entirely: a political instrument wielded by ruling elites to legitimize authoritarianism, curtail civil liberties, and obstruct the democratic process it was created to protect.

The transformation has been gradual but unmistakable. Since 2010, and particularly in recent years, the Court has issued a series of rulings that reveal a pattern of judicial overreach and politicization. Most notably, its 2022 decision to annul the Kurdistan Region’s Oil and Gas Law came not during a legal dispute, but amid a political power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil. By siding with federal authorities, the Court offered legal cover for the central government’s reassertion of control over regional oil revenues, effectively inserting itself into a partisan conflict.

One year later, the Court intervened in a battle over parliamentary leadership. What should have been a constitutional appeal became, under the stewardship of Chief Justice Jassim Al-Amiri, a tool for tilting the scales in a sectarian tug-of-war between Sunni and Shiite blocs. Al-Amiri went so far as to invite political parties to participate in constitutional deliberations—an extraordinary breach of judicial neutrality that marked the Court’s descent into the political fray.

These decisions did not merely reinterpret the Constitution — they effectively rewrote it. The rulings concerning the “largest parliamentary bloc” and the “blocking third” were issued under intense political pressure, with outcomes that appeared predetermined. The Court’s growing engagement in what can be described as “judicial legislation” saw it crafting constitutional solutions it had no authority to enact. In doing so, it exceeded its legal mandate and blurred the line between the judicial and legislative branches.

The consequences have been severe—not only for the political process, but also for civil liberties. In February 2024, the Court struck down the latest version of the Law on Freedom of Expression and Peaceful Assembly, plunging the country into a legal vacuum. In the absence of a regulatory framework, authorities exploited this gap to suppress protests and silence dissenting voices. In another troubling move, the Court rejected appeals filed against censorship laws that were passed under the pretext of “public morality,” thereby undermining civil society and freedom of expression.

Perhaps most emblematic of its authoritarian drift was the Court’s 2023 decision to uphold a law banning the import and sale of alcohol. This ruling flouted constitutional protections for religious and cultural pluralism and signaled the Court’s alignment with ideological forces seeking to impose majoritarian morality under the guise of legalism.

Together, these rulings paint a grim picture of a judiciary that no longer stands above the political fray but operates as its enforcer. The Federal Supreme Court has moved from arbitrating disputes to manufacturing political outcomes. Its decisions now carry the weight of unaccountable authority, often positioning the Court as a co-equal branch of governance—unchecked and ideologically aligned.

This crisis of legitimacy did not go unnoticed from within the institution itself. In an unprecedented development, six sitting judges and three alternates recently submitted their resignations, citing Judge Al-Umayri’s monopolization of decision-making and his overt bias toward certain factions. One day later, Judge Al-Umayri announced his own resignation, attributing it to health reasons. These resignations could mark a turning point—either toward a broader institutional collapse, or, more cynically, be used as a pretext to delay crucial elections under the justification of “legal instability.”

Without a functioning and impartial judiciary, Iraq’s democratic experiment is imperiled. A judiciary that validates repression and shields ruling elites from accountability becomes a core component of authoritarian rule. In this environment, even elections lose meaning, as they are no longer refereed by a neutral institution committed to upholding constitutional norms.

Calls for “reform” of the Federal Supreme Court now ring hollow. The problem is not one of mere dysfunction—it is structural. The Court, as currently constituted, cannot be rehabilitated. Any meaningful political reform must begin with the complete reconstitution of the Court under a new legal framework—one that enshrines judicial independence, enables parliamentary or popular oversight, and immunizes the institution from partisan capture.

Democracy without an independent judiciary is democracy in name only. Iraq’s future depends on more than elections and constitutions. It hinges on whether the institutions meant to protect those frameworks are willing and able to resist political manipulation. 

Until the Court is restored to its rightful role as guardian of the Constitution and defender of individual rights, any claims of a democratic transition in Iraq will remain not only unfulfilled—but deliberately and dangerously undermined.